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BIVENS V. SIX UNKNOWN NAMED AGENTS: A
NEW DIRECTION IN FEDERAL
POLICE IMMUNITY
About 6:30 a.m. on the morning of November 26, 1965, six
agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics forced their way into Webster
Bivens' apartment with drawn firearms. The agents forcibly manacled
Bivens in the presence of his wife and children and placed him under
arrest for alleged violation of the narcotics laws. After a warrantless
search of the apartment they took him to the federal courthouse in
Brooklyn to be interrogated, booked and strip searched. The criminal
complaint against Bivens was dismissed by a United States commis-
sioner.1
Following this dismissal, Bivens brought a civil suit in federal
district court seeking damages for humiliation, embarrassment and
mental suffering in the amount of $15,000 from each of the officers
based on a right of action under the Fourth Amendment. The district
court dismissed the complaint, holding that a claim for damages could
not be sustained because there was no express constitutional or statu-
tory provision for such a remedy and, even if there was such a right of
action, the defendants, as federal agents, were absolutely immune from
civil suit.2 The Second Circuit affirmed this holding on the former
ground and therefore did not reach the immunity issueY The Supreme
Court reversed, ruling that a valid claim for relief had been stated under
the Fourth Amendment. The case was then remanded to the Second
Circuit for a determination of whether the conduct of the defendants
was absolutely immune from private suit.
In a unanimous decision on remand, the Second Circuit held that
even though the defendants were federal officers, they did not have ab-
solute immunity and were merely entitled to the special defense of
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 456 F.2d
1339, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1972); Brief for Appellant at 2.
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Nare., 276 F. Supp.
12 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
3. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 409 F.2d 718
(2d Cir. 1969).
4. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
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"good faith and reasonable belief."5  With this holding, the court re-
jected a long-standing precedent which had extended the immunity priv-
ilege to low ranking federal officers, thus introducing a new standard
of accountability for such low level officials and, in particular, federal
police officers."
In exploring the result reached by the Second Circuit, this note
will trace: (1) the conflicting approaches to the immunity doctrine
prior to Bivens and the double standard which afforded federal police
officers an immunity denied their state police counterparts, (2) the
reasoning of the decision, its probable impact on other federal juris-
dictions, and its effect upon the individual federal policeman, and (3)
the issues left unresolved by the Bivens determination.
The Immunity Doctrine Before Bivens
The principle of granting government officials absolute immunity
from civil damage actions based on their official acts has its origin in
the common law7 and rests on a policy of noninterference with gov-
ernmental activities. This position is derived from a balancing of two
competing interests-that is, the protection of individual citizens against
irresponsible official action on the one hand and the protection of the
public by not inhibiting the performance of government officials by
threats of vexacious or vindictive lawsuits on the other.8 As a result
of this balancing, the concept of absolute immunity found an early place
in the federal law9 and over the years has been extended gradually from
high ranking government officials to lower level, minor officials. 10
5. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narc., 456 F.2d 1339,
1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
6. The low level federal officials affected by this decision include "Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and other federal police officers such as Agents of
the FBI performing similar functions, while in the act of pursuing alleged violators of
the narcotics laws or other criminal statutes .... " Id.
Consistent with the scope of coverage of Bivens, the term "police officer" will be
used in this note to describe public officials engaged in field investigatory or law en-
forcement functions.
7. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 579-82 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissent-
ing); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HAIW.
L. REV. 1 (1963).
8. Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
981 (1965); Preble v. Johnson, 275 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1960); O'Campo v. Har-
disty, 262 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1958); Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938).
9. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896) (high level officer in
executive department); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) (judges); cf. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 6 (legislators).
10. For a concise development of the doctrine of absolute immunity in the fed-
eral law, see Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 858-60 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
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As the protection of this doctrine expanded, a dichotomy devel-
oped between the treatment of federal police officers under the com-
mon law and that of state police officers held liable under the Civil
Rights Act.11 That act denied the state officer immunity in a damage
action under circumstances for which his federal counterpart would
be absolutely immune from suit.1" As a consequence of this double
standard, the injured citizen suffered because recovery was dependent
on whether the offending officer was acting under federal or state au-
thority. Perhaps the most radical attempt to reconcile this irrational
distinction was made by the First Circuit in introducting a "qualified"immunity test in Kelley v. Dunne."3 Although such an approach main-
tained some elements of the double standard, it did present a compro-
mise which narrowed the disparity of treatment.
These three positions-absolute immunity, no immunity, and
qualified immunity-coexisted in the federal courts immediately prior
to the Bivens case, thus forming the background upon which the Second
Circuit rendered its decision. Each position will be briefly examined.
Absolute Immunity: The Federal Common Law Approach
The modem benchmark for all federal immunity questions is the
Supreme Court decision of Barr v. Matteo.14 There, the Court ad-
vanced a two part test that has since served as the criterion for all
successive litigation on the immunity issue. Basically, this test grants
absolute immunity only after a finding that the defendant's level of
office in the federal hierarchy required the exercise of discretion1 5 and
that the defendant's conduct fell within the "outer perimeter" of his
scope of authority, irrespective of malice.
1 6
Inherent in the rationale underlying this standard is the judicial
380 U.S. 981 (1965); Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F.2d 257, 260-61 (4th Cir.
1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 (1951).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
12. Id.
13. 344 F.2d 129 (lst Cir. 1965).
14. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). This case dealt with a libel suit against the Acting
Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization for alleged malicious statements made in
connection with the termination of the plaintiffs' employment.
15. Id. at 573-75. Courts have often drawn a fine distinction between "discre-
tionary" functions requiring personal deliberation, decision and judgment, and those
which are merely "ministerial," amounting only to an obedience of orders or the per-
formance of a duty in which the officer is left with little choice of his own. This ele-
ment of the test for immunity has been criticized as being vague and a way of stating
rather than arriving at a result. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers:
Damage Actions, 77 HAv. L. REv. 209, 218 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Govern-
mental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 610, 642 (1955).
16. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959).
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recognition that certain government officials must not be unduly hin-
dered or harassed in the exercise of their responsibilities, even at the
risk of occasional abuse. Perhaps the most eloquent and widely quoted
statement justifying the protection of government officials under a
cloak of immunity was pronounced by Judge Learned Hand in Gregoire
v. Biddle:
17
The justification [for granting absolute immunity] is that it is
impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the
case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent
as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial . . . would dampen
the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible,
in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the
public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded
on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find him-
self hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. . . . [T]he an-
swer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in
either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end
better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers
than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread
of retaliation.'
8
Notwithstanding that the doctrine of absolute immunity as pro-
pounded in Barr and Gregoire was originally conceived as being lim-
ited to judges, legislators, and high ranking members of the executive
department, the federal courts have extended the protection of immu-
nity to lower level government officers.' 9 Although earlier cases had
conferred immunity to federal officers who generally engage in police
activities, -0 the case most frequently cited as illustrative of federal police
immunity is Norton v. McShane." In that case, the plaintiffs sought
damages for assault, battery and malicious prosecution arising out of
their alleged unlawful arrest and detention without probable cause.
22
The defendants in the action were Deputy United States Marshals.
17. 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
18. Id. at 581. Although Gregoire v. Biddle is not a Supreme Court decision, it
is considered a landmark by lower courts, as well as by the Supreme Court. Kelley v.
Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 132 n.5 (1st Cir. 1965). See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571
(1959).
19. Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
643 (1938).
20. Id. (FBI agent-malicious prosecution); Hartline v. Clary, 141 F. Supp. 151
(E.D.S.C. 1956) (Special Agents of the Alcohol and Tobbacco Tax Division-mali-
cious assault); Swanson v. Willis, 114 F. Supp. 434 (D.C. Alas. 1953), a!f'd 220 F.2d
440 (9th Cir. 1955) (Deputy U.S. Marshall-battery and false arrest).
21. 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
22. Specifically, the plaintiffs charged that they were (1) arrested on a public
highway without probable cause, (2) detained for 21 hours, including 18 hours sitting
in a rigid position without speaking, eating or drinking, (3) subjected to vile abuse and
mistreatment, and (4) assaulted with a large stick or billy club. Id. at 857.
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the suit on
the basis of the Barr test for absolute immunity:
[W]e must assume that to the extent the defendants allegedly acted
overzealously or maliciously, they were nevertheless acting within
the outer perimeter of their line of duty, and the alleged acts
had more or less connection with the general matters committed by
law to their control and supervision.
23
In so holding, the court reaffirmed the vitality of the immunity doc-
trine as it applied to federal police officers.
No Immunity: The Civil Rights Act Approach
Diametrically opposed to the absolute immunity standard is the
treatment of state police officers charged with violating the Civil Rights
Act, section 1983.24 This statute imposes civil liability on a person who
commits an act "under color of' state law which deprives a citizen of
a federally protected right.
Although the statute was originally utilized in litigation dealing
with racial discrimination, a series of cases since 1939 has consider-
ably widened its scope in protecting nonracial federal rights.25  The
first major case in this widening was Hague v. CIO, 6 in which the
Supreme Court recognized the use of section 1983 as the basis of an
action for injunctive relief. The next significant development was
Screws v. United States,27 decided in 1945. That case expanded the
construction of "under color of any statute"28 to include any act
under the "pretense" of statutory authority. In other words, a state
official who exceeded his authority or violated a state law was regarded
as having acted under the pretense of state law and was thus liable under
section 1983. Finally, in 1961, the Supreme Court2 9 advanced the
23. Id. at 861-62. Norton dealt solely with the question of whether or not each
defendant was acting within the outer perimeter of his scope of authority. There was a
conspicuous absence of discussion on the other element of the Barr test, whether the
defendant's function required "discretion." Arguably, this can be construed as an im-
plied assumption by the court that this class of officials exercised a sufficient degree
of discretion in their function to warrant immunity.
24. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceed-
ings for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
25. See generally Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers
Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 277 (1965).
26. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
27. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See note 24 supra.
29. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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proposition that an action under section 1983 was a tort action and,
as such, "should be read against the background of tort liability that
makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."3
Despite the absence of specific provisions in the Civil Rights Act
concerning immunity, many of the common law immunities are accorded
various state and local officials. Legislators, judges, municipalities and
executive officials have been held immune from damage suits under the
act. 1 On the other hand, state police officers are specifically denied
immunity.12 Nevertheless, as developed in Pierson v. Ray,33 such offi-
cers are entitled to the common law defense of "good faith and probable
cause." 3' This defense does not require the police officer to keep one
step ahead of the courts in determining the constitutionality of a statute
or his prospective conduct. That is, an officer acting in good faith will
escape liability even though his conduct is later determined to be un-
constitutional by the courts.35  Thus, even though a state police officer
is denied the immunity enjoyed by his federal counterpart, he does have
a measure of protection for his acts which are performed in good faith
and with probable cause.
Qualified Immunity: Kelley v. Dunne
The First Circuit, dissatisfied with the extreme disparity between
the above two approaches to the immunity doctrine, advanced a com-
30. Id. at 187.
31. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (judges); Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167 (1961) (municipalities); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (legisla-
tors); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981
(1965) (federal officials); Scolnick v. Lefkowitz, 329 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1964) (public
prosecutors).
32. Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds
sub norn. District of Columbia v. Carter, 93 S. Ct. 602 (1973); Basista v. Weir, 340
F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965); Cohen v. Harris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
33. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
34. Id. at 557; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 121 (1965); 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 3.18 at 277 (1956). The Court made it clear
that this defense was not available because of any language in § 1983, but because
that section was to be read in a manner consistent with the background of tort lia-
bility. Part of this background "in the case of police officers making an arrest, is the
defense of good faith and probable cause." Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57
(1967).
35. "If the jury believed the testimony of the officers and disbelieved that of the
[plaintiffs], and if the jury found that the officers reasonably believed in good faith
that the arrest was constitutional, then a verdict for the officers would follow even
though the arrest was in fact unconstitutional." 386 U.S. at 557; cf. Norton v. McShane,
332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964) (dissent), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965); Hughes v.
Johnson, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962). This defense, however, is not without its
problems. See Note, The Defense of "Good Faith" Under Section 1983, 1971
WASH. U.L.Q. 666.
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promise solution in Kelley v. Dunne. 6 Although the decision approved
of Judge Hand's policy arguments for protecting government officers
from frivolous or vindictive suits,3" the court confined the application
of the Barr test by narrowing the. definition of "scope of authority"
and offering a qualified immunity which conditioned the privilege on
the absence of malice. 8
In narrowing the concept of "scope of authority," the Kelley
court made a distinction not found in Barr. In that latter case, the
Supreme Court restricted the concept to "matters committed by law to
[the defendant's] control or supervision."3 9  Working within this defi-
nition, the Kelley court distinguished activities which were "prima facie
in accordance with [the official's] duties and customary behavior" from
activities which were out of the ordinary. 9 It was extraordinary con-
duct that the First Circuit excluded from the protection of absolute im-
munity. In other words, the Kelley approach limited the scope of au-
thority test to encompass only ordinary or customary conduct. 41
Even though the definition of scope of authority was thus nar-
rowed, the major departure from federal precedent occurred in the
First Circuit's introduction of qualified immunity. This innovation
allowed the injured citizen to defeat the federal official's claim of ab-
solute immunity upon proof of malice,42 defined as a "reckless indif-
ference to the rights of individual citizens. '43  Thus, the First Circuit
re-evaluated the relative importance of the public versus the private
interests and tipped the scale slightly in the direction of the private
citizen.4 Although th6 court was partially motivated by its desire
to eliminate the disparity between the federal common law and section
36. 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965).
37. Id. at 131. See text accompanying note 17 supra.
38. See id. at 132-33; 45 B.U.L. REv. 589 (1965); 53 GEo. LI. 1144 (1965);
44 TExAs L. REV. 570 (1966).
39. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 573 (1958).
40. Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 132 (lst Cir. 1965).
41. In applying this principle to the conduct of the defendant, the court dis-
tinguished the Barr situation involving the head of an agency who customarily made
press releases from the Kelley pase where a postal inspector uttered defamatory state-
ments under the unusual situation of making a search without a warrant. "In the
latter case, where an officer knows that he is acting out of the ordinary, he is on
notice of the circumstances, and there is more reason for him to have to expect to
be prepared to justify his conduct." Id. at 132-33.
42. Id. at 133. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
43. Id. "Entry upon private premises, without consent, on the assertion of a
warrant, knowing that there is none, would seem to us a prime example of reckless in-
difference to the rights of the individual citizen. . . . So also . . . is the uttering of
defamatory statements which are known to be false." Id. at 134.
44. This new standard would have its greatest impact upon low level officials
who, having a smaller range of discretion, would correspondingly have a narrower
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1983 approaches,45 the Kelley decision allowed some elements of a
double standard to remain.4 6 The significance of Kelley, however, is
its departure from the application of absolute immunity to low level
federal officials.4" Notwithstanding this significance, the Kelley stand-
ard has not met with approval by the other courts of appeals,48 perhaps
because of the inherent difficulty in determining what activities are
customary or ordinary.
The Double Standard
The above conflicting treatment of the immunity question gave
rise to a significant difference in procedural results based upon the is-
suing authority of the police officer's badge and the nature of the right
allegedly violated. In cases where a federally protected right was vio-
lated, a state police officer, vulnerable under section 1983,19 would be
without the protection of immunity and thus would be faced with trial.50
On the other hand, a federal police officer, bound only by the com-
mon law, would be able to assert his privilege of absolute immunity
during the pleading stage, thus avoiding trial for the very same con-
duct.5 This entitled the private citizen to damages only if the tortious
range of duties which may be considered customary or ordinary. See 53 GEo. L.J.
1144, 1150 (1965).
45. "[W~e find ourselves unable to see why federal investigatory officers should
be given absolute immunity for trespass under circumstances where, had they been
state officials, they might have found themselves personally responsible under an act
of Congress." Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965).
46. The Kelley standard still leaves a double standard of treatment in cases
where a federal officer acts without malice in an area of activity deemed to be custo-
mary.
47. In reaching this conclusion, the court was cognizant that their decision was
squarely opposed to Norton v. McShare, 332 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 981 (1965), but at the time of the Kelley decision, the application for writ cf
certiorari in Norton was still pending.
48. Numerous cases have continued to apply the Barr test rather than the
Kelley compromise approach in evaluating the conduct of these low level federal offi-
cials. See, e.g., Chafin v. Pratt, 358 F.2d 349, 353 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 878 (1966). Other cases, while not specifically rejecting Kelley, have found the
fact situation distinguishable and thereby continue to grant absolute immunity. E.g.,
Harrison v. Brooks, 446 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1971); Madison v. Manter, 441 F.2d
537, 539 (1st Cir. 1971); Gross v. Sederstrom, 429 F.2d 96, 100 (8th Cir. 1970);
Wright v. Corbin, 330 F. Supp. 739, 740 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Molever v. Lindsey,
289 F. Supp. 832, 835 (E.D. Mich. 1968); Progressive Securities, Inc. v. Young,
267 F. Supp. 20 (S.D.W. Va. 1967). No cases to date have applied the Kelley test
to limit or deny the privilege of absolute immunity.
49. See text accompanying notes 24-35 supra.
50. See Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
51. See Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d 855, 861 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 981 (1965).
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conduct was perpetrated by a state police officer. Such a double stand-
ard in the accountability of state and federal officers recently has been
the source of dissatisfaction among the judiciary."' For example, in
Anderson v. Nosser,8 Judge Bell wrote:
[A]ll police and ancillary personnel in this nation, whether state
or federal, should be subject to the same accountability under law
for their conduct. . . It is regrettable that we have one law
for Athens and another for Rome.54
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics
In March 1972, the Second Circuit had the opportunity to rule on
the immunity doctrine as it applied to federal police officers. The
court had at its disposal three principal approaches from which to pat-
tern its decision. First, it could follow the federal common law which
granted absolute immunity.55 Second, it could advance a policy sim-
ilar to that found in the Civil Rights Act.5 Third, it could take the
Kelley approach of qualified immunity.57  Judge Medina, in a unani-
mous decision, elected to adopt the second approach, thereby marking
a major departure from the law developed in the other circuits.
In reaching this decision, the court was strongly motivated by
policy considerations. It sought to restore a more even balance be-.
tween public and private interests, to eliminate the double standard,
and to provide a deterrent against police misconduct. In order to
achieve these goals, the court strained the application of the Barr test 58
using it only as a vehicle to support the departure from the entrenched
federal common law. The discussion that follows will focus on that
analysis and the effect of the holding from the perspective of the fed-
eral police officer, the other federal courts, and the injured citizen.
Scope of Authority
In utilizing the two part test for immunity introduced in Barr v.
52. See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (concurring
opinion), rev'd sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 93 S. Ct. 602 (1973);
Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1166 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061
(1972); Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 205 (5th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion);
Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965); Norton v. McShane, 332 F.2d
855, 869 (5th Cir. 1964) (dissent), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 981 (1965).
53. 438 F.2d 183 (8th Cir. 1971).
54. Id. at 205 (concurring opinion).
55. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 24-35 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 36-48 supra.
58. See text accompanying notes 14-16 supra.
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Matteo, 9 the court examined the element of scope of authority in a
manner which clearly demonstrated the court's intention to reach a de-
cision through policy considerations. First, the court distinguished be-
tween what it characterized as the broad and narrow views of "scope."
Judge Medina indicated that these views resulted from the courts' having
"trouble grappling with this concept."6  Such an intimation of prior
confusion, however, is not justified upon closer examination of the three
cases cited as illustrative of the narrow view. In Hughes v. Johnson,6
the Ninth Circuit restricted the Barr test by excluding violations of
constitutional rights from scope of authority. 62 Kelley v. Dunne"
limited Barr to conduct which is prima facie within the defendant's
duties and customary behavior." The third case, Kozlowski v. Fer-
rara,5 held that a finding of probable cause was required before a
warrantless arrest could be within the scope of authority.66 Instead of
acting out of confusion, each of these three decisions affirmatively re-
stricted the interpretation of the scope of the officer's authority. Such
limitations were in contrast with the broad view, which considered acts
having "more or less connection with the general matters committed
by law to their control and supervision"67 as falling within the defini-
tion of "scope."
Although the Bivens court did not so analyze these decisions, the
mere fact that they were included as illustrating the narrow view is
worthy of further consideration. Arguably, the courts, in deciding
the above cases, manifested their conviction that federal police officers
59. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
60. 456 F.2d at 1343.
61. 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962).
62. "The question is whether a search without a warrant and unsupported by
arrest, in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, can
be said to fall within the scope of the official duties of these appellees. In our view,
it cannot, and accordingly immunity does not extend to such conduct." Id. at 70.
It should be noted, however, that this case turned on a procedural point. Because the
Ninth Circuit felt that the lower court's dismissal of the complaint was based on an
erroneous belief that the Barr test granted immunity for unconstitutional acts, the
dismissal was set aside, and the plaintiff was granted leave to amend the com-
plaint. Id.
63. 344 F.2d 129 (1st Cir. 1965).
64. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
65. 117 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
66. Id. at 652. The issue before the court was the defendant's allegation that
the plaintiff's waiver of a preliminary hearing was tantamount to a finding of prob-
able cause. The court rejected that contention so that the defendant was unable to
support his claim for immunity. It should be noted that the court did not reach the
merits of the case.
67. Norton v. MeShane, 332 F.2d 855, 862 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 981 (1965).
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should not be protected by absolute immunity under all circumstances.
In other words, the narrow construction of scope of authority, by re-
stricting its application, was merely a reflection of the judicial attitude
that there is "no compelling need to superimpose, absolutely, the public
interest upon private rights."68
If the Bivens court was actuated by similar motives, it too would
have attempted a narrow construction of scope of authority, thereby
restricting the application of the immunity doctrine. However, the
court stated that a narrow view is inadequate because scope of au-
thority would too often be the controlling factor in determining the im-
munity question, thus precluding an examination of the discretion ele-
ment of the test. In Judge Medina's words, such a consequence would
leave unresolved the more vital policy question of "whether the official
duty in the performance of which the defendant was engaged was or
was not deemed to be worthy of the protection of immunity." 69  After
stating this preference to use the discretion test as the vehicle for de-
ciding the case, the court elected to follow the broad view of "scope"
and, in summary fashion, found that requirement satisfied:
We believe that what is meant by the phrase "within the
outer perimeter of [an officer's] line of duty" is that the officer
must have been acting in his role as a government officer. Here,
the duties of these defendants include making arrests in cases in-
volving narcotics. They were doing just that.70
Discretion
Having found that the officers were acting within the scope of
their authority, the court examined the issue of discretion and, in so
doing, developed its policy arguments. Motivated by a desire to elimi-
nate the double standard and to provide a deterrent to police miscon-
duct,7 1 the court categorically held that federal officers performing po-
lice duties do not warrant the protection of absolute immunity.72
In reaching this conclusion the court first rejected the contention
that the immunity doctrine applies only to high level officials, citing
Justice Harlan's opinion in Barr:
The privilege [of absolute immunity] is not a badge or emolument
of exalted office, but an expression of a policy designed to aid in
the effective functioning of government. 73
68. Kelley v. Dunne, 344 F.2d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 1965), citing Hughes v. John-
son, 305 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1962) and Kozlowski v. Ferrara, 117 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
69. 456 F.2d at 1344.
70. Id. at 1345.
71. See id. at 1346, 1347.
72. Id. at 1346.
73. Id. at 1345, citing 360 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1959).
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Judge Medina then rejected the semantic exercise involved in deciding
the immunity question based on interpreting a word such as "discre-
tion." Rather, he relied upon the reasoning in Ove Gustavsson Con-
tracting Co. v. Floete:
There is no litmus paper test to distinguish acts of discretion...
and to require a finding of "discretion" would merely postpone,
for one step in the process of reasoning, the determination of the
real question-is the act complained of the result of a judgment
or decision which it is necessary that the Government official be
free to make without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits
and alleged personal liability?
74
In other words, the immunity question was not to be resolved by an
examination of the facts on a case-by-case basis. Rather, it was neces-
sary to analyze the class of officials of which the defendants were
members to decide if the effective functioning of government would be
aided by a general policy of immunity for that class.
The court, however, did not intend to reject the discretion ele-
ment of the test outright and advanced the proposition that other courts
which had spoken in terms of "discretion" were merely using that word
to verbalize the policy considerations behind its use. Acknowledging
the fact that police officers must, of necessity, exercise some discretion
in their normal course of work,75 Judge Medina noted the holdings of
other courts that police activities were not discretionary. Characteriz-
ing this apparent contradiction as a "fiction," he maintained that those
courts were, in reality, making basic policy decisions arising from their
belief "that the benefit to society derived from the protection of per-
sonal liberties outweigh[ed] the detriment of perhaps deterring vig-
orous police action. '7 6  Therefore, it was the Second Circuit's conten-
tion that its construction of the discretion test was entirely in line with
past cases which had dealt with that issue through a definition and ap-
plication of the word "discretion."
An analysis of the supporting authorities presented, however, tends
to weaken that contention. Of the two cases cited, only one, Carter
v. Carlson,7 7 involved a federal officer, but the court's expression of
74. 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962), cited in 456 F.2d at 1346. It is of inter-
est to note that both cases were heard by the same panel of Judges Medina, Waterman
and Lumbard, with Judge Medina writing both opinions. The Bivens case, coming ten
years after Ove Gustavsson, squarely presented the Second Circuit with an opportunity
to resolve the policy question they had raised earlier.
75. See W. LAFAvE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY
(1965).
76. 456 F.2d at 1346.
77. 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. District
of Columbia v. Carter, 93 S. Ct. 602 (1973). Although the defendants in this case
may technically be categorized as federal officers, they were actually police officers of
the District of Columbia.
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policy in that case was mere dicta contained in a footnote.7 8  The other
case, Sherbutte v. Marine City,7 9 dealt with state officers and contained
no expression that such a policy was behind the conclusion that mak-
ing an arrest was not discretionary. Perhaps the strongest argument
that can be found among the secondary authorities cited by the court
in support of its analysis is that advanced by Professor Louis L. Jaffe:
It is my thesis that the immunity which runs in terms of the ex-
istence of discretionary power represents to a greater or less ex-
tent in each case of its application or nonapplication a balancing
of certain important factors, some of these being factors which
neither courts nor writers have been concerned to isolate.80
The Second Circuit did isolate a factor-that of the balance between
private and public interests. Nonetheless, in light of the importance
of the Bivens case in striking a new direction in the immunity doctrine
as applied to federal police officers, it is disappointing that the court
did not provide more case authority which directly supported its con-
clusion that prior use of the term "discretion" was a shorthand ex-
pression for the policy considerations which it had identified.
Effect of the Bivens Decision on the Federal Police Officer
Having ruled that federal police officers were not protected by
absolute immunity, the court did not leave these officers completely
to the mercy of litigious citizens. Due to the indispensable functions
that federal police officers perform, a proper balancing of interests
demands that they be protected by the special defense of good faith
and reasonable belief that the arrest and search were lawful and rea-
sonable. 81 This defense is not innovative; it always has been available
to the police officer at common law, embodied in the expression "good
faith and probable cause. '82  This is also the same defense applicable
78. "[To hold that making an arrest is not discretionary] presumably reflects a
long-standing judgment that the threat of damage suits does not significantly impede
the effective operation of a police department, when the impediment is weighed
against the public interest in a tort remedy for police misconduct." Id. at 363 n.9.
79. 374 Mich. 48, 130 N.W.2d 920 (1964).
80. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARv.
L. REv. 209, 219 (1963), cited in 456 F.2d at 1346.
81. 456 F.2d at 1347, 1348.
82. "[Tlhis has been consistently read as meaning good faith and 'reasonable
belief' in the validity of the arrest or search." Id. at 1347; see RESTATFMENT
(SEcoND) oF TORTS § 121(b) (1965). It was made clear by the court that "probable
cause" in this context was not to be defined in the constitutional sense, but was to
be measured by the less stringent reasonable man standard of the tort action against
government agents. Id. at 1348, 1349. Ordinarily, when this type of civil action
goes to trial, the determination of lack of probable cause in the constitutional sense
for an arrest and search will have already been made during the preliminary phases
of the criminal proceeding.
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to cases arising under the Civil Rights Act, section 1983.11
Although future courts applying this standard will have the bene-
fit of cases decided under the common law and the civil rights statute,
they will also inherit its problems. One such problem centers around
the meaning of "good faith." Some courts have held that good faith
is restricted to what the officer actually intended-that is, his subjec-
tive state of mind. Other courts, including the Bivens court, have at-
tached an additional requirement which examines the reasonableness
of the officer's actions in view of the surrounding circumstances. This
objective approach carries with it the implied danger that the courts
will engage in second guessing the decisions of these officers.84
The practical effect of the Bivens decision upon the federal police
officer can best be illustrated by examining the procedural differences
between an absolute immunity and no immunity. In the past, when
federal police officers enjoyed the protection of absolute immunity, the
typical response to a plaintiff's complaint was a motion for summary
judgment. Because of this immunity, the courts generally granted the
motion and dismissed the case. Under the Bivens decision, however,
the defendant officer must file an answer asserting his affirmative de-
fense. This procedure is illustrated by Judge Lumbard's concurring
opinion:
The trial judge will pass on the sufficiency of the complaint just
as he would in a section 1983 action against a state police offi-
cer. If the complaint states a cause of action and the plaintiff
adduces substantiating proof, the defendant will have to disprove
the allegation that he acted without probable cause, or show that,
in any event, he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief
in the validity of the arrest and search.
8 5
It is likely, therefore, that in cases where the defendant officers for-
merly avoided trial because of the immunity doctrine, more instances
of alleged misconduct will now go to trial on the merits. This being
the case, it is probable that the future will find more federal police
officers liable for damages to those citizens whose rights had been vio-
lated.
Considering the fact that the Bivens court was motivated by its
desire to provide a deterrent against what they saw as a "woeful laxity"
on the part of federal officers in complying with constitutional stand-
ards,86 it is not unreasonable that the court struck the balance of inter-
83. 456 F.2d at 1347, citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
84. See 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 666; see text accompanying note 35 supra.
85. 456 F.2d at 1348.
86. Id. at 1346. Judge Medina provided little support for this claim. See gen-
erally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, at 178-90 (1967); REPORT OF THE NAT'L AD-
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ests in favor of the private citizen. It certainly can be expected that
the threat of going to trial and the possibility of financial liability will
deter the federal police officer's vigorous pursuit of his duties. Never-
theless, such an effect must be considered in light of the desirability
of providing a remedy to the private citizen who is injured as a result
of the officer's misconduct-that is, an orderly society must be bal-
anced against a just society.
Impact of the Bivens Decision on Other Federal Jurisdictions
By denying immunity to federal police officers, the Bivens court
essentially held that the protection of individual rights is of greater
importance than the preservation of the relatively unhindered practices
of police officers. In so doing, the court eliminated the double stand-
ard which had existed in the treatment of federal, as opposed to state,
officers, 7 but this effect is necessarily confined to the Second Circuit.
Consequently, the question of whether this decision will have a wider
national impact depends upon the other circuits' acceptance of the
Bivens rule."' Because some courts previously expressed dissatisfaction
with the double standard, it is unlikely that any judicial resistance will
stem merely from this issue. More likely, the major point of disagree-
ment will focus on the Second Circuit's position favoring the interests
of the private citizen and may transform what was previously a "deli-
cate balance" into a sharp conflict between the public versus the pri-
vate interests.
Courts which are least likely to follow Bivens are those which
hold a sharply opposing point of view by striking the balance in favor
of the public interest. Such a view is typified by the language in Craig
v. Cox, a District of Columbia case:
We are rapidly reaching the point where a law enforcement offi-
cial will be afraid to carry out his authority for fear that he might
have to answer in a civil suit for damages. . . . I believe that
enough roadblocks have already been erected in their path with-
out adding to them.89
On the other hand, courts more likely to be persuaded by Bivens
VISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS (N.Y. Times ed. 1968); SAN FRANcisco Colm.
ON CRIME, REPORT ON THE SAN FRANcisco POLICE DEP'T pts. I & II (1971).
87. See text accompanying notes 49-54 supra.
88. National impact would also be achieved, of course, if the Supreme Court
ruled on the immunity question as applied to low level federal officials. However, be-
cause the federal government did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in Bivens,
a Supreme Court ruling, if one comes at all, must be preceded by another case pre-
senting this issue under a different set of facts.
89. Craig v. Cox, 171 A.2d 259, 263 (Mun. App. D.C. 1961) (dissent), affd
per curiam, 304 F.2d 954 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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are those which, while granting immunity, have expressed misgivings
as to the wisdom of conferring absolute immunity on lower level fed-
eral officials. Typical of these courts is the Fifth Circuit, which in
Chafin v. Pratt stated:
It may well be that the immunity doctrine has now been extended
too far, that the policy of the doctrine as analyzed by Judge
Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle . ..merits reexamination.
• . . But thus far judicial resistance to the immunity doctrine
has taken the form of restriction of its scope rather than rejection
. . . . [T]he defense of immunity "imposes a drastic impinge-
ment on personal liberty." 90
Finally, the courts most likely to follow the direction taken by
Bivens are those which not only expressed misgivings, but took affirm-
ative steps to limit the application of the immunity doctrine. These
courts include the First Circuit, which in Kelley v. Dunne narrowed
the meaning of scope of authority and advanced a doctrine of qualified
immunity,9" and the Ninth Circuit, which in Hughes v. Johnson ex-
cluded unconstitutional activities from falling within the scope of au-
thority.92
As far as the other federal jurisdictions are concerned, any fore-
casts of the impact of Bivens upon them must be tempered with caution
due to the lack of strong authority supporting the Second Circuit's
analysis of discretion.
93
The Plaintiff's View: An Unresolved Problem
Notwithstanding the uncertainties in the future acceptance of the
Bivens rule, an examination of the decision from the plaintiff's per-
spective will reveal other problems that have been left unresolved.
Initially, it should be noted that as far as a citizen's redress of grievances
against police misconduct is concerned, a civil damage action is only
one method of holding an officer accountable. A citizen may also
90. 358 F.2d 349, 353 n.9 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 878 (1966). See
also Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972);
Anderson v. Nosser, 438 F.2d 183, 205 (5th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion). It is of
interest to note that the Chafin and Anderson cases were decided by the 5th Circuit,
as was Norton v. McShane, the case most frequently cited as conferring absolute im-
munity on federal police officers.
91. See text accompanying notes 36-48 supra.
92. See text accompanying note 62 supra. Since the Bivens case was rendered,
a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit, in dictum, accepted the rule denying im-
munity to low level officials engaged in police activities. Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp.
314, 317 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
93. Two other cases decided subsequent to Bivens, however, have indicated some
support for that decision. See Jones v. Perrigan, 459 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1972) (dic-
tum); Balistrieri v. Holtzman, 55 F.R.D. 470 (E.D. Wisc. 1972).
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file a criminal complaint against the officer or file a complaint with
the appropriate agency or department for internal resolution. In addi-
tion, exclusionary rules of evidence are available as sanctions against
illegal police work. 4  If, in the past, these alternatives had provided
effective relief to the citizen and had operated as deterrents against
police misconduct, the issue of immunity probably would be less criti-
cal today. The fact that immunity still remains a viable topic for con-
sideration indicates a relative ineffectiveness of the other alternatives in
meeting these goals.95 Consequently, it would seem logical, now that
a civil damage action against federal police officers has been made
available, it should become more widely utilized.
Whether more citizens do turn to this remedy in the future, how-
ever, will depend to a large extent on the defendant officer's financial
ability to satisfy a judgment. Although federal police officers may
presently be found liable for damages, they will rarely be in such a fi-
nancial position to make the instigation of a civil suit worthwhile. The
federal government, on the other hand, certainly would be able to bear
the financial burden of money damages, but now is free from such lia-
bility. Professor Jerome Hall has posed the problem in the following
manner:
The upshot is that where there is legal liability, as in the case of
the policeman, the fact of financial irresponsbiility is usually a
conclusive obstacle to recovery. And where there is financial
responsibility, as in the case of the city, there is no legal lia-
bility.96
Presently, the liability of the federal government for the miscon-
duct of its employees is defined by statute, which specifically excludes
damage actions brought against police officers. 97  In contrast, a few
94. See generally Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual
Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955). However, the exclusionary rule is of no use
to a person who was innocent of the crime charged and was not brought to trial.
95. For an evaluation of the various remedies available to the citizen seeking
redress of grievances against police misconduct, see PRE SDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY, at 293 (1968); PRESiDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRA-
TION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE, at 193-205 (1967); REPORT oF
THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DIsoRDERS, at 310-312 (N.Y. Times ed. 1968).
96. Hall, Police & Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 154 (1953);
see Sherbutte v. Marine City, 374 Mich. 48, 50, 130 N.W.2d 920, 921 (1964); PRnsI-
DENT'S COMM"N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: THE POLICE, at 199 (1967).
97. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1971) authorizes the
payment of claims for the "negligent or wrongful act or omission" of an employee
acting within the scope of his governmental employment However, it specifically ex-
cludes claims based upon acts or omissions in the execution of a statute or regulation
and claims arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious
prosecution, deceit, or interference with contract rights. Id. § 2680(a), (h).
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states have attempted a statutory resolution by providing for indem-
nification or requiring a bond. 98
It would seem appropriate, then, that in order for a citizen to
realize the full practical benefits of the Bivens decision, some measure
must be taken to insure the financially responsibility of the defendant. 9
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent in the Supreme Court's treatment
of Bivens, commented that the doctrine of respondeat superior in tort
law provided an entirely appropriate basis for congressional action to
provide such a remedy.100 Under this reasoning, current federal stat-
utes, such as the Federal Tort Claims Act or the Civil Rights Act, could
be amended to provide financial relief, possibly modeled after the in-
demnification or bonding statutes now in effect in several states. Al-
ternatively, Congress could require federal police officers to carry
personal liability insurance as protection against potential damage ac-
tions. Finally, Congress could establish an administrative board with
quasi-judicial powers to hear all cases of this type, determine liability,
The Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971), likewise provides no assistance
since it makes no provision to authorize the payment of claims by the government.
In 1961, the Civil Rights Commission concluded that this statute was ineffective and
recommended that it be amended to allow suits against the local governments for the
policeman's acts. UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIviL RIGHTS REPORT bk 5, at 67-71,
113 (1961).
98. See Shapo, Municipal Liability for Police Torts: An Analysis of a Strand
of American Legal History, 17 U. MIAMI L. REv. 475 (1963). Illinois, for example,
has a law which provides for the indemnification of policemen by municipalities
for judgments recovered as a result of injuries to third persons, except when the in-
juries result from the policeman's wilful misconduct. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 1-4-5
(Smith-Hurd 1962). Connecticut similarly provides indemnification for any munici-
pal employee. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN., § 7-465, -308 (West 1972). In Kentucky,
policemen and sheriffs must post bond. Ky. REv. STAT. § 95.750 (1971).
99. Relieving the defendant police officer of financial responsibility would elimi-
nate one factor which could provide a deterrent effect against police misconduct. This
consequence must be balanced against the interest in assuring adequate compensation
to the injured citizen. See Comment, Money Damages for Unconstitutional Searches:
Compensation or Deterrence?, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 276.
However, under the Bivens decision, the federal officer would still be faced with
the threat of having to go to trial and bear the attendant publicity, stigma and possible
humiliation. This threat, which heretofore had not existed, could still provide a
measure of deterrence.
For a contrasting rationale behind placing liability on the government, see Mathes
& Jones, Toward a "Scope of Official Duty" Immunity for Police Officers in Damage
Actions, 53 Gao. L.J. 889 (1965).
100. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Nare., 403 U.S. 388,
422 (1971) (dissent). In advancing this proposition, Chief Justice Burger was
expressing his dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule of evidence as a deterrent to
police misconduct. He suggested the abolition of that rule in favor of legislation
which would establish a quasi-judicial body to administer the payment of damage
claims in actions brought against police officers.
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and award compensation to the injured citizen. While these remedies
are not advanced as representing ultimate solutions, nor even as a com-
plete list of alternative approaches, nonetheless they do illustrate pos-
sible remedies for congressional investigation and action.
Conclusion
This note has examined the conflicting manner in which the im-
munity doctrine has been applied to officers performing police func-
tions. This variation has created an irrational double standard in the
treatment of federal and state police officers in damage actions.
The note then focused upon the Second Circuit's recent decision
in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, in which the court determined that the protection of the indi-
vidual citizen against police misconduct weighed more heavily than the
public's interest in an uninhibited and unhampered police force. In
making this judgment, the court aligned itself with the Civil Rights Act
approach to the immunity issue and thus denied federal police officers
absolute immunity. Instead, the court substituted a special defense of
"good faith and reasonable belief."
It has been argued that the likely effect of the Bivens decision will
be an increase in the number of damage suits against federal police of-
ficers reaching trial. To the injured plaintiff, the full realization of the
decision's benefits, however, will be mitigated due to the uncertainty
of the defendant officer's financial ability to satisfy a judgment. In
order to assure the financial responsibility required to fairly compen-
sate a citizen for his injuries, this note has urged that legislation be en-
acted to shift the financial burden to the federal government.
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